Russian Provocative Gestures Amid Ukraine Stalemate

Russian Provocative Gestures Amid Ukraine Stalemate

Amiel Gerald A. Roldan™

November 19, 2026


Russian strategic aviation activity near Japan and Taiwan, culminating in a rare deployment of Tu-95MS bombers to Vietnam in mid-November 2026, occurred against the backdrop of Russia’s prolonged, high-cost war in Ukraine and concurrent high-level diplomacy in China.

 

The flights—two Tu-95MS strategic bombers (NATO: “Bears”) departing Ukrainka Air Base in Russia’s Far East, briefly entering Japanese territorial airspace near Okinoshima, transiting South Korean and Taiwanese air defense identification zones (ADIZs) east of Taiwan, and landing at Da Nang International Airport alongside support aircraft—represent a deliberate power-projection signal.


This took place immediately ahead of President Vladimir Putin’s arrival in Shenzhen for the APEC summit and a planned trilateral with Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump. The episode raises a pointed question: with Russian forces engaged in a grinding, attrition-heavy campaign in Ukraine that has imposed severe personnel and material costs without decisive strategic victory, why conduct such provocative long-range operations in East Asia? The pattern does not primarily indicate a belief that Russia can simultaneously wage high-intensity war against the entire world. Rather, it reflects calculated signaling, alliance management with China, residual global reach demonstration, and efforts to sustain a great-power narrative under material constraints.


The Incident and Its Immediate Context

Open-source tracking and official statements from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea established the sequence. Five Tu-95MS departed Ukrainka; three conducted a lengthy training flight over the Sea of Japan with tanker support, while two continued south. Japan reported brief territorial airspace violations (roughly three minutes each) northwest of Okinoshima on 17 November, prompting scrambles and a formal protest. The aircraft then passed the Tsushima Strait, between Yonaguni and Taiwan, and through Taiwan’s ADIZ before proceeding toward Vietnam, where the bombers and Il-76 transports arrived at Da Nang—the most significant such Russian strategic aviation presence in Southeast Asia in years, possibly more than a decade.


Taiwan recorded a second instance of Russian aircraft activity east of the island later in the week. These were not routine patrols; Russian long-range aviation has historically used similar corridors (including Cold War-era flights toward Cam Ranh Bay), but post-2022 activity of this scale and visibility is uncommon. The timing aligned precisely with Putin’s China itinerary and the broader APEC gathering, amplifying the political message.


Russia’s Position in Ukraine: Attrition Without Breakthrough

By late 2026 the war had entered its fifth year. Russian forces continued offensive pressure in sectors of Donetsk and elsewhere, but analyses from the Institute for the Study of War and others indicated high daily casualty rates (often exceeding 2,000), recruitment shortfalls relative to losses, net territorial stagnation or limited reversals in recent months, and heavy reliance on drones, artillery, and North Korean/Iranian-supplied munitions. Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian infrastructure, including bridges and energy facilities, persisted. Russia controlled roughly one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory (including Crimea), yet maximalist political objectives remained unmet and the human and economic costs were extreme.


This is not a force free to open multiple high-intensity fronts. Strategic aviation and naval assets in the Pacific and Arctic have been partially insulated from the Ukraine theater, but overall force generation, munitions stocks, and industrial capacity remain under strain. The East Asian flights therefore represent selective use of residual long-range capabilities rather than surplus capacity for global multi-theater conventional war.


Strategic Rationales for Provocative Gestures

Several interlocking motives explain the activity.


First, power projection and signaling of residual reach. Despite Ukraine, Moscow retains intercontinental-range platforms and the ability to generate complex long-range missions with aerial refueling and support. Landing nuclear-capable bombers in Vietnam—historically a partner with access arrangements dating to the Soviet period—demonstrates that Russia can still operate across the Indo-Pacific. Analysts such as Ian Storey have noted that such deployments remind regional states that Moscow has not been reduced solely to a European theater actor. This serves both external audiences (U.S. allies, ASEAN states) and domestic ones, reinforcing the narrative of Russia as a global great power rather than a regional power locked in a costly war.


Second, alliance management and coordination with China. Sino-Russian military cooperation has deepened since 2022, including joint bomber patrols and exercises. Flights that pressure Japan and Taiwan align with Chinese interests in the East and South China Seas and around Taiwan without requiring Beijing to conduct them itself. The APEC/trilateral timing allowed Putin to arrive as a partner capable of independent action that complements, rather than subordinates itself to, Chinese priorities. Russia’s “Turn to the East” and Greater Eurasian Partnership concepts frame Asia as both an economic alternative and a domain in which Moscow can act as a third pole alongside the United States and China.


Third, Vietnam and Southeast Asian positioning. Hanoi maintains a carefully balanced foreign policy, viewing Russia as a useful counterweight to China while deepening ties with the United States and others. A rare bomber deployment to Da Nang signals continued military relevance and historical partnership without forcing Vietnam into alignment choices. It also tests regional air defense responses and gathers electronic intelligence.


Fourth, gray-zone competition and cost imposition. Brief airspace violations and ADIZ penetrations force Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to scramble fighters, expend resources, and issue protests—classic gray-zone tactics that raise costs for adversaries at low risk of escalation to open conflict. Russia’s nuclear arsenal and the broader multipolar narrative provide a protective umbrella. Similar patterns appear in the Arctic, near Alaska, and in European airspace probes. These actions do not require the force structure needed for simultaneous high-intensity wars; they exploit the fact that democratic allies must respond publicly and operationally while authoritarian systems can calibrate opacity.


Fifth, narrative and diplomatic leverage. Ahead of meetings involving Trump, Xi, and Putin, visible military activity projects strength and complicates any Western attempt to isolate Russia. It supports the framing that Western sanctions and support for Ukraine have failed to reduce Russia to a secondary actor, a message useful both in Global South outreach and in bilateral bargaining.


Interpretation: Calculated Risk, Not Omnipotence

The premise that Russia “believes it can engage the whole world at once” overstates the case. Full-spectrum, multi-theater conventional war against NATO, Japan, and others simultaneously exceeds current Russian conventional capacity, especially given attrition in Ukraine. Strategic culture in Moscow emphasizes great-power status, spheres of influence, and resistance to a U.S.-led order; nuclear weapons, asymmetric tools (drones, cyber, proxies), and partnerships with China and North Korea compensate for conventional shortfalls. Provocations in Asia are relatively low-cost ways to sustain that status claim, support partners, gather intelligence, and impose decision-making burdens on competitors.


Historical precedent exists in Soviet-era long-range aviation deployments and post-Cold War probing flights. What has changed is the intensity of the Ukraine commitment and the degree of dependence on China. The November 2026 flights illustrate continuity in Russian operational art—selective demonstration of reach—more than a new doctrine of unlimited multi-front engagement. They also highlight structural limits: such missions remain episodic rather than sustained presence, and they rely on a finite pool of aging but still capable platforms (Tu-95MS).


In sum, the activity is best understood as opportunistic signaling within constraints. Russia remains heavily committed in Ukraine, where costs continue to mount and decisive victory remains elusive. Concurrent East Asian operations serve alliance diplomacy, regional influence, and great-power image maintenance. They do not demonstrate unconstrained capacity to fight everywhere at once; they demonstrate a willingness to use residual long-range assets for political effect in a competitive multipolar environment. Whether this pattern yields strategic advantage or merely accumulates friction with multiple powers simultaneously remains an open question for regional stability.


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About the author. 

Amiel Gerald A. Roldan© (born 1972, Mandaluyong City, Philippines) is a multidisciplinary Filipino visual artist, printmaker, painter, independent curator, researcher, writer, and cultural worker whose practice has unfolded since the mid-to-late 1990s. He is not primarily defined by discrete artworks but by sustained engagement with the full ecology of Philippine contemporary art: production, exhibition-making, documentation, pedagogy, criticism, artist development, and the often-invisible labor that sustains cultural infrastructure.


Educated in Studio Painting (BA Fine Arts and Certificate of Fine Arts) at the University of the Philippines Diliman (roughly 1993–1998), Roldan’s practice quickly expanded beyond painting into printmaking, photography, installation, writing, and curatorial work. Early recognition included an Honourable Mention from the Art Association of the Philippines (1995) and international print exhibitions: the 1996 Japan-Asia Print Exhibition at the Fukuoka Prefectural Museum and the 4th Triennial Mondiale d’Estampes Petit Format in Chamalières, France (1998). His prints from this period addressed socially charged subjects, including HIV/AIDS work beginning around 1995, and titles such as Mga OCWs Galing Pinas, Karaoke Queen, Mga Tinikling Dancers ng Pinas, Wealth, Liberate, Permanence, and Abundance. These works treat printmaking as a vehicle for social commentary, cultural documentation, and reflection on Filipino identity, marginality, labor, and everyday experience.

A pivotal chapter came with the 2003–2004 Asian Cultural Council (ACC) Starr Foundation Fellowship. Roldan spent approximately ten months in the United States, working in association with the International Studio and Curatorial Program (ISCP) in New York—where he was among the early Filipino participants—and the Experimental Printmaking Institute in Pennsylvania. He also held a Chashama studio residency in Tribeca. The fellowship enabled observation of contemporary practices, dialogue with international artists and curators, and production of new work that linked local concerns with global contexts. More recently, his piece Bridges Beyond Borders (representing cultural collaboration and exchange) was selected as visual identity for the ACC Global Alumni Network, underscoring a two-way circulation of ideas rather than one-directional “representation” of the Philippines abroad.

Key contributions to Philippine art can be understood across interconnected dimensions:

1. Printmaking as socially engaged practice — Roldan has consistently used the medium for questions of identity, migration, popular culture, inequality, and Filipino lived experience, situating the print within a tradition that functions simultaneously as aesthetic object, document, and argument.

2. Artist-curator continuum — He has organized and curated exhibitions, documented practices, and supported artist development with institutions and spaces including Hiraya Gallery, Jorge B. Vargas Museum, Kulay Diwa Art Galleries (where he served in curatorial/directorial roles), Cultural Center of the Philippines, NCCA-related projects, Imahica Art, Gallerie Anna, and others. He has collaborated with figures such as Roberto Chabet, Brenda Fajardo, and international artists (e.g., from Studio One in Canberra, as well as practitioners from Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Korea). More recently he has worked as program/marketing director and consultant curator for art fairs and spaces (including involvement with Manila Bang Show 2024 and MOCAF 2024). For Roldan these activities are not peripheral administration but forms of creative and intellectual labor.

3. Independent curatorial culture — He founded or leads Independent Curatorial Manila (ICM), conceived as an independent/voluntary curatorial service and guide for emerging Filipino artists. This reflects a commitment to pathways outside strictly institutional structures in an ecosystem heavily reliant on informal networks, galleries, independent spaces, and personal relationships.

4. International exchange and cultural memory — Beyond the ACC fellowship, his practice emphasizes postcolonial discourse, cultural memory, social inequality, politics, religion, faith, denial, courage, and everyday Filipino life. Writing, research, archiving, and annotation form integral parts of the work; recent reflective essays (including “Cultural Workers: Not Creative?” associated with a 2025 group exhibition at ILOMOCA) explicitly challenge hierarchies that privilege object-making over documentation, facilitation, pedagogy, marketing, and infrastructure-building.

5. Art as research and infrastructure — Roldan’s trajectory is circular rather than linear: artist → researcher → curator → writer → organizer → archivist → facilitator → artist. Making exhibitions possible, mentoring, documenting overlooked histories, building counter-archives, and writing critically about the conditions of art production are treated as artistic acts in their own right. This challenges romantic notions of the solitary artist and reframes the cultural worker as central to the art ecology.

Works are held in collections including the Singapore National Gallery / Singapore Museum, Luciano Benetton Collection (Imago Mundi / Venice), Rockefeller-related holdings, Lisa H. Mackie Collection, Philippine Department of Health collection, and the Experimental Printmaking Institute. Solo exhibitions include Memoirs of Pipay (Hiraya Gallery, 1996/2000), Pasintabi (Kulay Diwa, early 2000s), and Creating Identities (UP CFA Corridor Gallery, 2014), among others; group shows span Philippine institutions and international print platforms.

In one concise framing: Amiel Gerald Roldan is an artist-curator-cultural worker whose practice connects art-making with memory, social inquiry, international dialogue, independent curation, and the construction of cultural infrastructure. His potential legacy resides equally in the artworks produced, the ideas articulated in writing and reflection, and the often-invisible relational and organizational labor that helps other artists and artworks circulate. In a Philippine contemporary art field shaped by limited institutional resources and dense interpersonal networks, that third dimension—the work of making the ecology function—may prove among the most consequential.



Recent group show at ILOMOCA

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/16qUTDdEMD 


https://www.linkedin.com/safety/go?messageThreadUrn=urn%3Ali%3AmessageThreadUrn%3A&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.pressenza.com%2F2025%2F05%2Fcultural-workers-not-creative-ilomoca-may-16-2025%2F&trk=flagship-messaging-android

Chashama at 40 Worth Open Studios  

https://chashama.org/event/40-worth-open-studios-phase-1/


Asian Cultural Council Alumni Global Network 

https://alumni.asianculturalcouncil.org/?fbclid=IwdGRjcAPlR6NjbGNrA-VG_2V4dG4DYWVtAjExAHNydGMGYXBwX2lkDDM1MDY4NTUzMTcyOAABHoy6hXUptbaQi5LdFAHcNWqhwblxYv_wRDZyf06-O7Yjv73hEGOOlphX0cPZ_aem_sK6989WBcpBEFLsQqr0kdg


https://www.instagram.com/tv/ChiTnSEl1VN/?stkn=MWhwZmV2ZWxvYjA1NA==



 









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 Disclaimer:

This work is my original writing unless otherwise cited; any errors or omissions are my responsibility.The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of any organization or institution.

Furthermore, the commentary reflects my personal interpretation of publicly available data and is offered as fair comment on matters of public interest. It does not allege criminal liability or wrongdoing by any individual.

 

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