PBBM and the ICC: Honeymoon Over? A Summary of the Commentary by Deus Rex Juricsiel

PBBM and the ICC: Honeymoon Over? A Summary of the Commentary by Deus Rex Juricsiel

The Facebook post by Deus Rex Juricsiel, dated the previous day at 1:33 PM, presents a sharply critical analysis of the shifting dynamics between Philippine President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (PBBM), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the United States under President Donald Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Framed around the provocative headline “PBBM AND ICC HONEYMOON OVER?”, the commentary argues that the earlier alignment between Malacañang and the ICC—once portrayed as a partnership delivering justice—is rapidly unraveling under the weight of a newly assertive American policy. The author portrays this as a forced and painful choice for PBBM, one that exposes the limits of Philippine autonomy and the costs of earlier strategic decisions.

The piece opens by recounting the initial phase of cooperation. Despite earlier claims that the Marcos administration would not engage with the ICC, the government reversed course: confirmation hearings moved forward, former soldiers linked to the Duterte era were exposed, and the process culminated in the arrest of former President Rodrigo Duterte. With Duterte detained in The Hague, PBBM and his allies were depicted as celebrating a victory that removed a major political rival while burnishing an image of accountability. The author labels this a “premature celebration,” arguing that the ICC had become a convenient “Swiss knife” for neutralizing critics such as Senator Bato dela Rosa and others who could be linked, however tenuously, to the court.

That celebration was interrupted when U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio publicly described the ICC as “a stupid organization run by lunatics and crazies.” The U.S. government, according to the post, launched a broader campaign to dismantle the court and warned of “increased scrutiny” of nations that continue to support it while relying on American assistance. Undersecretary Claire Castro initially dismissed the significance of Rubio’s remarks, stating, “Hindi sakop ng ating gobyerno ang polisiya ng bansang US” (“The policy of the United States is not under the jurisdiction of our government”). The author treats this response as either naïve or deliberately nonchalant, arguing that it revealed an inability—or unwillingness—to grasp the implications of a major power declaring open hostility toward the ICC.

Within a short time, Malacañang began to backpedal. Officials announced that the government was “reviewing its policy” on cooperation with the ICC. The author interprets this as a tacit admission that the Philippines cannot afford to defy Washington. Castro’s later claim that the United States “understands” the Philippines’ residual obligations to the ICC, and that the court was not even discussed during Rubio’s courtesy call on PBBM, is portrayed as contradictory and unconvincing. The post notes that it was Philippine Ambassador Jose Manuel Romualdez who raised the issue, further complicating the official narrative of distance and independence.

The commentary sharpens its critique by linking the diplomatic friction to concrete economic pressure. A day after Castro downplayed Rubio’s statements, President Trump announced an additional 12.5 percent tariff on the Philippines. The author presents this as no coincidence, suggesting it was a deliberate signal that there is “no room for negotiations.” Ordinary Filipinos, the post argues, are once again made to bear the cost of PBBM’s earlier decisions. Rubio’s warning of heightened scrutiny for nations that reject the ICC’s “false authority” while depending on U.S. support is treated as far from optional; the claim that residual obligations somehow exempt the Philippines is dismissed as wishful thinking.

At the heart of the analysis lies a stark dilemma for Marcos. Continuing full cooperation with the ICC would amount to “spitting on Rubio’s declaration” and risk further American retaliation. Dropping the ICC, however, would mean relinquishing a useful instrument against domestic opponents and could invite further arrests that might expose “PBBM’s hand right inside the ICC cookie jar.” The author contends that PBBM cannot simply walk away from an institution he chose to engage, nor can he ignore the explicit demands of the United States. The result is an impasse that forces a choice between the ICC partnership and placating Washington—a choice the post insists the United States will not allow to be resolved by a polite “no.”

The broader judgment is unsparing. The ICC is described, in Rubio’s own words, as an organization that has “outlived its purpose or its pretensions to such.” Castro’s assertion of equal footing between nations is rejected as living in a world of “make believe”; in reality, the Philippines remains heavily dependent on the United States and cannot afford to say no. The “honeymoon” with the ICC is therefore ending not because of any sudden moral awakening, but because American policy has made continued collaboration costly and politically untenable. More developments are expected, the author warns, and Filipinos should brace for further reversals. In the author’s view, the United States has already “nailed the final coffin to the ICC,” and PBBM must now decide whether to end the relationship or continue risking American displeasure—knowing that Washington does not take “no” for an answer.

In sum, the post constructs a narrative of strategic miscalculation followed by forced retreat. What began as a calculated use of international institutions to manage domestic politics has collided with a hard-power American realignment. The result, according to Deus Rex Juricsiel, is that President Marcos finds himself constrained on both sides: unable to fully abandon the ICC without domestic political cost, and unable to retain it without inviting economic and diplomatic pressure from the United States. The “honeymoon” is over, and the choices that remain are painful ones.